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ABSTRACT
Encryption is the primary tool for protecting information
security, but cyber-physical systems that interact directly
with critical infrastructure, in applications such as power,
water and transport, typically use no encryption for their
control messages at all. This is because computer systems
that interface to physical devices are subject to strict real-
time constraints and it is widely assumed that the compu-
tational overheads of encryption are too high in such sit-
uations. Indeed, some international standards for critical
infrastructure systems explicitly recommend against using
encryption.
Here we present experimental results proving that data
encryption can be used to defend cyber-physical systems
within the timing constraints imposed by international stan-
dards for data communications in electricity distribution
substations, even when using conventional hardware and
software. To ensure the validity of the results we created a
testbed composed of industry-standard devices, and to guar-
antee the experiments’ accuracy we measured data packet
timing using specialised hardware synchronised to GPS time.
Our results provide the first detailed analysis of the time
taken to encrypt, transmit, and decrypt a critical infra-
structure protocol using a stream cipher in a realistic phys-
ical environment.
Furthermore, in safety-critical systems data confidential-
ity is not the only information security concern. Data in-
tegrity must be preserved as well. We therefore show that
such timing results are possible even when using an au-
thenticated encryption algorithm, which provides both data
confidentiality and integrity, thereby paving the way for de-
ploying strong encryption technologies in cyber-physical sys-
tems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the past critical infrastructure networks were physi-
cally isolated (“air gapped”) from the wider world and re-
lied on obscure, special-purpose hardware. However, with
the cost savings and additional functionality afforded by the
convergence of network hardware over recent years, critical
infrastructure devices are now increasingly standardised and
their control systems are often connected to corporate net-
works and even the Internet. This added interconnectivity
vastly increases the potential for cyber attacks [21].
Large-scale, high-cost critical infrastructure is typically
long-lived, with individual systems running for decades and
remaining in service well beyond their originally-planned
useful life. Most of the communication protocols used in
critical infrastructure were not designed with information
security in mind, because physical perimeter security of
the network was assumed. Furthermore, some international
standards for critical infrastructure [17, 18] explicitly recom-
mend that basic security measures such as data encryption
not be used in control networks, due to their anticipated
impact on data traffic timing. Overall, therefore, critical
infrastructure network operators are faced with increasing
security concerns, as systems with little or even no inherent
security mechanisms become more and more exposed.
This growing awareness of the unprotected nature of crit-
ical infrastructure has resulted in a wealth of research liter-
ature and international standards, such as IEC 62351 Power
Systems Management and Associated Information Exchange:
Data and Communications Security [18], in an attempt to
provide security for critical cyber-physical infrastructure.
Nonetheless, the communication protocols used for control
systems remain unprotected [17, Part 7]. Concerns about
the computational overheads associated with encryption have
led some researchers to recommend only encrypting data
at the system’s exit points, rather than inside the critical
infrastructure perimeter itself [20, 30]. This is unaccept-
able, however, when cyber attacks can originate from within
the security perimeter, as can happen when on-site contrac-
tors conducting system monitoring and maintenance connect
malware-infected equipment directly to critical infrastruct-
ure, thus bypassing all perimeter defences.
That encryption is now required within a control system’s
perimeter is evidenced by recent research on encrypting all
the major control system protocols [12, 36, 10]. Unfortu-
nately, this research has been done either with no consid-
eration of timing constraints [36], or has been conducted in
simulated or theoretical environments [10] which overlook
significant features of the actual system. Consequently, it
remains open whether or not encryption is feasible in prac-
tice for critical infrastructure, within the strict timing con-
straints specified in international standards [14].
Here we demonstrate conclusively that encryption is vi-
able for time-sensitive control systems. Using commer-
cial Network Interface Controllers (NICs) we acquired, en-
crypted, transmitted, received, decrypted and retransmit-
ted data packets from a control network, within the tightest
timeframe specified in the electrical transmission interna-
tional standard IEC 61850-5 [17, Part 5], namely 3ms, and
for the messages with the strictest timing constraints, Per-
formance Class 2/3. Indeed, we show that this is possible
even with software encryption, which is far slower than ded-
icated encryption hardware would be for the purpose. Most
importantly, not only do we show that data confidentiality
can be protected, but we used an authenticated encryption
algorithm, which additionally provides assurances of data in-
tegrity, as is highly desirable in a critical infrastructure set-
ting. To ensure the validity of our results we constructed a
testbed comprising industry-standard critical infrastructure
devices, and to guarantee accuracy we took measurements
using specialised equipment synchronised to a GPS clock.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Knowledge of four broad areas is essential when consider-
ing encryption for critical infrastructure: timing constraints
required for communicating with physical equipment; secu-
rity goals which need to be accomplished; encryption meth-
ods suitable for the task; and prior research specific to the
encryption of critical infrastructure protocols.
2.1 Speed Versus Cyber-Security
Often cited as the single reason not to encrypt control sys-
tem data traffic is the delay encrypting a packet would add
to its transmission latency. The extra delay is not only due
to the inherent cost of encryption, but also because cyber-
physical devices often have low computing power. The guid-
ance to not encrypt may be specific or general, such as the
National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST’s)
guidelines, which state that industrial control systems “have
unique performance and reliability requirements compared
with IT, and the goals of safety and efficiency must be
considered when implementing cybersecurity measures” [26].
Below we identify some of the more specific instructions and
constraints regarding timing of control system data traffic.
Various standards exist for end-to-end data traffic timing.
For instance, in the context of electricity substations, IEEE
Standard 1646 Communication Delivery Time Performance
Requirements for Electric Power Substation Automation [14]
defines maximum communication times for messages, either
in absolute terms or relative to the electricity transmission
frequency. These timing constraints are designed to ensure
the stability, reliability and safety of the electricity network
in a variety of scenarios, such as when tripping physical cir-
cuit breakers in response to faults.
More specific standards exist for particular communica-
tion protocols. For instance, the GOOSE protocol, from
International Electrotechnical Commission Standard 61850,
is widely used in electrical critical infrastructure [17, Part 5].
GOOSE messages in this context have an end-to-end timing
constraint of 3ms and are among the most stringent we have
encountered in critical infrastructure systems. The aversion
to encryption is captured in the following two quotes from
international standards that define the GOOSE protocol [17]
and specify the information security measures to use with
it [18]. Firstly, IEC Standard 61850, which defines the pro-
tocol, states the following regarding encryption techniques
that may be used for GOOSE messages:
“For sampled values and GOOSE peer-to-peer
communication that are multicast datagrams
and not routable, the messages need to be trans-
mitted and received potentially as fast as within
a quarter of a cycle (4 to 5ms). This implies
that most encryption techniques or other secu-
rity measures which affect transmission rates are
not acceptable” [17, Part 1].
Secondly, the international standard for security in power
systems management and associated information exchange,
IEC Standard 62351, states:
“For applications using GOOSE and IEC 61850-
9-2 and requiring 4ms response times, multicast
configurations and low CPU overhead, encryp-
tion is not recommended” [18, Part 6].
Having established that time is the main constraint pre-
venting critical infrastructure from being appropriately en-
crypted, a bound on how long encryption and decryption
may take needs to be established. While the two quotes
above both state 4ms as their lower bound [17, Part 1][18,
Part 6], a different part of IEC 61850 requires 3ms for Class
P2/3 trip (GOOSE) messages [17, Part 5]. Such lower
bounds vary depending on the frequency used for mains
electricity in a given country, so that 50Hz countries have
a greater time interval for a circuit breaker to trip within
a set portion of an alternating current cycle than a country
with 60Hz alternating current. For our purposes we used
the tighter time bound of 3ms as our target.
2.2 Security Goals
In traditional security, there are three main security
goals, confidentiality, integrity, and availability [22, 19] (with
other requirements such as privacy and authentication being
treated as special cases). In the case of cyber-physical sys-
tems, availability is achieved via regular maintenance and
engineered redundancy [19]. The remaining two goals, how-
ever, are both the responsibility of cryptographic mecha-
nisms [25]. Confidentiality is defined as “keeping informa-
tion secret from all but those who are authorized to see it”
and integrity is “ensuring information has not been altered
by unauthorized or unknown means” [22].
In critical infrastructure, security goals are typically pri-
oritised as availability followed by integrity and then con-
fidentiality [15] or even reduced to only availability and
integrity [37]. Focusing only on availability and integrity
aligns well with the engineering ideal of keeping critical
infrastructure working, but ignores its business aspect. For
instance, energy production and distribution are part of a
competitive market place. Significant profits depend on the
confidentiality of data in electricity systems [2], so encryp-
tion is needed to provide an assurance of confidentiality.
Overall, therefore, an ideal security mechanism for critical
infrastructure will provide both confidentiality and integrity.
For this reason we focus here on authenticated encryption,
which is the process of simultaneously providing confiden-
tiality and integrity assurances to messages [3].
2.3 Encryption with Stream Ciphers
There are many types of encryption. For our experiments
we chose to use a stream cipher. Stream ciphers are part of
symmetric-key cryptography, meaning that both the sender
and the receiver have the same key or password. They usu-
ally involve “XORing” a stream of key bits with a stream
of plaintext [7]. Since exclusive-or is one of the fastest op-
erations a computer can do, and key stream generators can
be created efficiently in hardware, stream ciphers have been
used whenever high speed real-time communication is re-
quired, such as for mobile telephone communications [35].
Stream ciphers traditionally only provide assurances of in-
formation confidentiality. However, as noted above, for crit-
ical infrastructure we need data integrity as well. Usually
this involves encryption for confidentiality, followed by use of
a Message Authentication Code (MAC) for integrity. How
to inexpensively provide both confidentiality and integrity
simultaneously is a research goal [31], and a few stream
ciphers now support “authenticated” encryption. As de-
fined by ALMashrafi, authenticated encryption is “the cryp-
tographic process of providing simultaneous confidentiality
and integrity protection to messages” [3].
For our experiments we wanted a software, rather than
hardware, based stream cipher to provide a worst-case sce-
nario with respect to timing overheads. Rabbit is a stream
cipher designed to execute in software, which encrypts whole
bytes and words (128bits) at a time, rather than single
bits [6]. However, Rabbit only provides confidentiality, and
not integrity. Although it is slower than Rabbit, SNOW is a
cipher that can provide both confidentiality and integrity [7],
and is used in mobile telephone networks [28]. Specifically,
SNOW 3G is used within the combined “confidentiality and
integrity” mobile phone algorithm set EEA1/EIA1 [27].
2.4 Prior Critical Infrastructure Encryption
In this section we review relevant communication proto-
cols and research prior to ours on encryption in critical infra-
structure systems.
Three protocols widely used in critical infrastructure are
MODBUS, DNP3, and GOOSE. MODBUS is a client-server
protocol widely used in industrial control networks, includ-
ing critical infrastructure [24], defined in 1979. Recently,
MODBUS has been implemented over TCP/IP to work on
an Ethernet-based network [23]. DNP3 is newer than MOD-
BUS and is widely used in electrical power critical infra-
structure. DNP3 was defined in 1993 and standardised in
2010. DNP3 was originally designed for point-to-point serial
communication, but has since been adapted for transmission
over Ethernet-based networks [13]. It uses a Master-Slave
model. GOOSE is a protocol from IEC Standard 61850 [17].
IEC 61850 provides a suite of protocols, which are typically
used in electrical critical infrastructure. The GOOSE proto-
col has strict timing requirements, as outlined in Section 2.1,
and is used in a publisher-subscriber model. The 61850 suite
of protocols is the current industry standard.
Encryption for critical infrastructure has been a research
focus for some time. Similar to our work, West created
a bump-in-the-wire solution for DNP3 and MODBUS [36].
Bump-in-the-wire means that encryption happens outside
of the device being protected. Once the data is transmit-
ted from the device to be protected, the packets are passed
through another device which encrypts the packets, before
sending the new encrypted packet on through the network.
However, while this prior work is similar to ours, it did not
take into account the important timing constraints applica-
ble in some critical infrastructure.
Another approach to securing DNP3 and MODBUS was
by Hayes and El-Khatib [12]. They replaced MODBUS TCP
by wrapping MODBUS and DNP3 in the Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (a competitor to TCP/IP) and used
hashed message authentication codes. However, while say-
ing that encryption should not be computationally expen-
sive, they did not measure time saved or time sensitivity.
Encryption for the GOOSE protocol has been imple-
mented previously by Fangfang et al. [10]. Similar to us,
they observed that hardware (FPGAs) was faster than soft-
ware for the purpose, and they presented some promising
timing results. However, their network was virtual, using
OPNET software, and their FPGA timings were theoretical,
cited from another paper. It does not appear that at any
stage were real control devices used, nor had the encryption
and decryption actually been done in practice. Our exper-
iments were fully implemented, on real hardware, demon-
strating how to acquire packets from the network, how to
encrypt them and how to put the packets back on the net-
work.
Similarly, Raza et al. presented research into secure
GOOSE packets [29]. They modelled their network using
the NS-2 network simulation program. The results in their
paper were based on simulation alone. In particular:
“[The figures] show average packets end-to-end
delay for the GOOSE message for a selected bay
at station level for normal GOOSE message and
encrypted GOOSE message respectively. It is
clearly shown in the graph that normal GOOSE
packets are transmitted with the maximum delay
of 7.3µs for the bay while the minimum delay is
about 7µs. While for encrypted GOOSE message
maximum delay is about 17.8µs and minimum
delay is 17.1µs.” [29].
However, all that was measured in this case was the trans-
mission time on a simulated wire, not the encryption time or
decryption time, all of which must be considered inside the
GOOSE time limit (which Raza et al. define optimistically
as 4ms [29]). Indeed, as shown by our experiments below,
simply giving a message to a NIC and the NIC putting the
message onto the wire takes around 250µs and encrypting is
in the order of 400µs, so quoting maximum delay figures of
17.8µs omits significant real delays which must be consid-
ered.
As we have seen, recent academic literature is replete with
encryption mechanisms for critical infrastructure. However,
we have found no prior work which has considered the time-
sensitive nature of critical infrastructure messages, has actu-
ally implemented solutions rather than citing others’ work
regarding encryption times, and has used real equipment
rather than simulated and virtual environments. By con-
trast, we demonstrate that encryption is possible in practice,
using industry-standard equipment, inside the tightest time-
frames specified in international standards, when measured
with GPS accuracy.
3. APPROACH
Central to our research was the need to test our work on









Figure 1: Architecture of the experimental environment.
ronment. This introduces many practical issues, such as how
to synchronise the clocks between the sending and receiving
machines. The generic layout of our solution is shown in
Figure 1.
As shown, the two communicating devices are Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs), which is the generic name for
devices which provide control services for feeder or line pro-
tection, transformer protection, and circuit breaker manage-
ment in an electricity network. IEC Standard 61850 defines
IEDs as “any device incorporating one or more processors,
with the capability to receive or send, data/control from, or
to, an external source, for example electronic multi-function
meters, digital relays, controllers” [17]. In practice, these
devices currently have little or no in-built security.
In our experiments we used the same equipment currently
deployed in electricity transmission substations. We set up
two IEDs as a publisher-subscriber pair exchanging GOOSE
messages. An operator pressing a button on the front of the
first IED results in the transmission of a GOOSE packet to
the second IED which interprets the message and, for the
purposes of the experiments, turns on an indicator light on
its front panel. As explained further in Section 5, the IEDs
themselves were standard equipment used in the power in-
dustry, specifically a General Electric C60 Breaker Manage-
ment Relay [11] and a Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories
SEL-421 Protection Automation Control [32].
3.1 Timing Constraint and Cipher Selection
As already discussed in Section 2.1, we chose the worst-
case timing goal of 3ms for our experiments in encrypted
communication between IEDs. Also, as noted in Section 2.3,
since low computing power is a common feature of critical
infrastructure equipment, stream ciphers were chosen as the
focus of our tests since they are considered to be the lightest
and fastest encryption mechanism. Specifically, we settled
on the EEA1/EIA1 algorithm set [27], which is based on
SNOW 3G, and is one of the few authenticated encryption
stream ciphers, to support both data confidentiality and in-
tegrity.
3.2 Packet Encryption Method
Data packets consist of a header and a payload, so when
encrypting packets on a network there are two main op-
tions, as shown in Figure 2. One method is to encrypt the
entire packet, including the header information which nor-
mally tells switching equipment where to forward the packet.
However, if this approach is used a new header needs to
be added to the encrypted packet, so that the packet can
still reach its intended recipient. This is essentially what
happens in a Virtual Private Network (VPN). The second
method is to retain the existing packet header information,
and encrypt only the data payload.
While the first approach may seem simpler, it means
that packets will increase in length due to the addition of
the new message header. This would usually add at least
24 bytes to the length of a message and could cause a large
packet to exceed the network’s maximum packet size, typi-
cally 150 bytes, forcing us to split the data in half and send
two packets. The extra time required to split, transmit and
reassemble the packets is unlikely to be acceptable, so we
chose the second method for our experiments and encrypted
the payload only.
3.3 Implementation Methods Trialled
In principle a purpose-built Network Interface Controller
(NIC) could perform the necessary packet encryption at al-
most “line speed” [16], once the header and payload are sep-
arated, but in the absence of such hardware for critical infra-
structure devices and protocols, we had to choose between
three main alternatives before settling on our preferred ap-
proach for the timing experiments: (1) using specialised net-
work capture equipment; (2) writing our own software for
specialised network capture equipment; and (3) using stan-
dard NIC hardware with an optimised Linux kernel to create
a software implementation. Each of these approaches was
explored as explained below.
(1) Hardware implementation, using specialised
networking equipment: Initially we considered a hard-
ware implementation, using a customisable Endace Data
Acquisition and Generation (DAG) Card [9]. This card is
designed to capture and replay packets at high speed, and
has a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) on the card
itself. By using one of the four ports on the Endace card
as an input port, and another port as an output port, the
Endace card can be used as an inline tap with some level of
computing capability. It was hoped that the data passing
through the network could be XORed with a sequence of
1s and 0s on the Endace card to emulate a hardware based
solution, such as would be used in a real implementation
with dedicated Application-Specific Integrated Circuits or
FPGAs.
Endace allows firmware images to be uploaded to the
FPGA using the dagrom utility. The FPGA was found to be
a Xilinx XC2V1000. While writing a custom firmware image
for the FPGA is theoretically possible, it requires expensive
software and a substantial amount of time. In particular,
we would be obliged to develop functionality equivalent to
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Figure 2: Comparison of packet encryption methods, whole packet or payload only.
more, our analysis showed that a large part of the FPGA
die is already used by the stock Endace firmware, and there
is a lack of spare IO to deliver the encryption key stream to
XOR against. Overall, therefore, it was found that develop-
ing a pure hardware solution would have been prohibitively
expensive for conducting our timing experiments.
Instead, our focus moved to using the DAG card in a sup-
ported configuration as a specialised network capture card,
as explained in the next step below. In this role, the DAG
card acquires network packets independently from the CPU
and general operating system, while oﬄoading the encryp-
tion functionality to the processor.
This trial showed that, with existing firmware already oc-
cupying the networking card’s on-board FPGA, there is no
spare capacity to add additional functionality such as XOR-
ing for encryption. Re-writing an entire firmware to handle
network capture, packet manipulation, and cryptography
was considered prohibitively difficult and time-consuming
(and expensive if licensing fees for the necessary FPGA pro-
gramming software are considered). Therefore, a general-
purpose CPU based solution was pursued instead.
(2) Hardware/software implementation, using
specialised networking equipment and a software
NIC: As a simpler alternative to customised hardware, we
next considered software-based encryption, with an Endace
DAG card essentially acting as a NIC. The API provided by
Endace allows for the capture and generation of packets in
conjunction with custom software. Preliminary tests using
the Endace API to present packets to user space to facili-
tate encryption proved successful, so work began on parsing
the packets presented by the API into a usable form. This
approach is outlined in Figure 3.
Many of the functions provided by a NIC and operating
system network stack needed to be coded in software to han-
dle the packets being provided by the DAG card. Parsing
the packets proved laborious and prone to errors difficult
to debug, due to the pass/fail nature of I/O data streams.
Nonetheless, the research proceeded and prototypes were
created.
The initial implementation of this approach was based on
a requirement that no packets could be lost in a critical infra-
structure setting. Hence interrupts were used to ensure each
packet was handled. Since the solution required many in-
terrupts, this resulted in very poor performance (500–800ms
transmission time), due to using a software implementation
rather than the capabilities of the DAG card itself.
Nevertheless, an implementation using a DAG card in-
stead of NICs could be computationally advantageous as
any processing performed on the DAG card does not affect
the CPU. However during our experimentation using the
Endace API, it became clear that its API is designed for
use in large feature-complete software packages rather than
small-scale packet processing. The DAG card produces the
entire Ethernet frame without any formatting or prepara-
tion. After the API is used to capture the packet the frame
needs to be unpacked, formatted and stored by the custom
application before any encryption can be applied.
Therefore, as a proof of concept, the requirement that
no packets could be lost was relaxed. Indeed, there is no
such requirement on the other networking equipment such
as switches in the critical infrastructure network, and proto-
cols such as GOOSE have built in measures to handle packet
loss. In this way, an interrupt-free solution was developed,
resulting in transmission times of 40–100ms, without en-
cryption, but this was too slow to meet our performance
goals. Since much of the time associated with encrypting
and decrypting was based on the software implementations
of typically purpose-built hardware NICs1, the decision was
made to move to using standard NIC hardware, with soft-
ware encryption, as explained below.
While an interrupt-based solution may generally be re-
quired in high traffic systems to ensure that no packet is
dropped, this trial showed that an interrupt-based solution
is too slow on a general purpose CPU and operating system
(over 500ms), so polling should be used instead. Equally im-
portant is that the output of the IEDs is so slow that there
is no difference between interrupt or polling solutions, from
a packet loss perspective. Finally, software NICs are far too
inefficient for our needs, and hence hardware NICs must be
used.
(3) Software implementation, using standard
NICs: Since NICs provide networking functions in dedi-
cated hardware far faster than can be executed in software
on a general purpose CPU, the decision was made to use
NICs with software encryption. This new solution required
the implementation of packet forwarding into memory, ma-
1The latest Endace DAG cards provide an additional “NIC
emulation” functionality, which allows the card to be used as
a tap (Ethernet network bridge)/tun (IP routing) interface,
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Figure 4: Modular design for software encryption approach.
nipulation in memory, then replay of the packet out of a
network interface.
Initial progress proved successful and much more abstrac-
tion was available compared to the Endace API. Initial
packet forwarding performance without encryption was 3–
4ms. This timeframe was acceptable as a non-optimised
proof of concept, so a more detailed modular approach was
designed. The three modules are shown in Figure 4.
To simplify early testing, encryption was ignored as it
could be added later. The results of these early tests were
positive (1–2ms). At this point the solution had the same
functionality as a network switch, i.e., accepting a packet
on one NIC and forwarding the packet out of another NIC.
The fact that the solution could perform functionality equiv-
alent to a network switch while remaining within the target
latency constraints made the approach highly promising.
As this solution progressed, bitwise XOR was used as a
place holder for future encryption. The header was sep-
arated from the payload, stored, a bitwise XOR was per-
formed on the payload, and then the header re-joined to the
encrypted payload. During the course of adding these fea-
tures, performance began to degrade to outside acceptable
limits (4–10ms).
To aid in the debugging process, the solution was migrated
to a virtual environment to gain greater control over the
machine variables. The use of virtual machines for testing
aided in the diagnosis of multiple issues with the solution.
The information provided by the ESXi 6.0 Hypervisor pro-
vided insight into the operating system not possible on bare
metal. Using a virtual network at this stage of the project
assisted with debugging because virtual mirror ports could
be used on all of the virtual network cards at the same time,
allowing for visibility at every point in the network. The
virtual environment thus allowed a working solution to be
constructed. A modification to the architecture presented
in Figure 4 was made, so that instead of requesting pack-
ets from the operating system, the packets were requested
directly from the network drivers.
While packets were now being transferred, the perfor-
mance was unacceptable. The additional latency for tak-
ing a packet from the network, encrypting it with a bitwise
XOR, and placing the packet back onto the network was in
the range 20–50ms. Therefore, the handlers were re-written
to use as little abstraction as practical and instead manip-
ulate the data directly in C. Performance vastly improved
using this approach, and the timeframe went back to 2–4ms.
However, in making these adjustments, the capability to
encrypt using stream ciphers such as SNOW, ZUC and Rab-
bit was lost. Instead the bitwise XOR was replaced by the
ChaCha20 cipher [1], which was easier to implement. At
this stage the end-to-end performance was close to our goal,
but not quite acceptable, at 3.8ms.
Due to the changes necessary while implementing
ChaCha20, the data manipulation performed in C became a
bottleneck. Therefore the implementation was reverted back
to using the standard network stack. While using the op-
erating system and network drivers reduced the complexity
of the solution and made the solution more efficient, prior
issues were reintroduced. For example, now the operating
system processes could move or manipulate memory at the
wrong time. To alleviate this, all non-essential operating
system components were removed or disabled. This lim-
ited the “normal” functionality of the operating system, but
produced much more stable performance. However, the re-
stricted operating system meant that ChaCha20 could no
longer be used. Since Google had moved ChaCha20 to
the OpenSSL library [1], we transitioned to using OpenSSL
and investigated several other ciphers that are part of the
OpenSSL suite.
While exploring these options and settling on a final ap-
proach, decisions that forced movement from stream ciphers
to block ciphers, and on to OpenSSL, were made due to
functions no longer working as we progressed through test-
ing and removal of operating system capabilities. Stream ci-
phers are still the fastest, and hence we wanted to return to
a stream cipher. Having learnt from the prototyping steps
detail above, and having settled on an approach, we then
created our final implementation as described in Section 4
below.
This trial showed that if standard kernel and operating
system calls are used to access packets from the NIC, and if
the implementation is not completely compliant, the kernel
drivers may overwrite memory where the packet is stored.
This causes legitimate packets to be corrupted and may
cause the custom written code to malfunction when the
modified memory is used as the legitimate packet. While
the obvious solution may be to therefore access the NIC
drivers directly from custom code, the kernel and operating
system were found to be far more efficient. The kernel was
faster than the custom code even when obvious inefficiencies,




























Figure 5: Software encryption implementation.
observed in the kernel’s implementation and removed in the
custom code. Therefore, the kernel and operating system
should be used to access the packets from the NIC. How-
ever the other parts of the kernel and operating system that
generate network traffic need to be uninstalled or halted.
4. FINAL IMPLEMENTATION
Having worked through various potential approaches as
outlined in Section 3.3, we developed our final solution for
use in the timing experiments. In the prototyping work of
Section 3.3 NanoBSD was used as the operating system, but
NanoBSD is best suited for embedded systems. To provide
more capability with our final implementation, FreeBSD ver-
sion 10.1 was used as the operating system for both the
encrypting and decrypting machines. The final software en-
cryption method used for the timing experiments is shown
in Figure 5.
4.1 Architecture
An alternative solution was devised to solve the network-
ing problems described in Section 3.3. Many of the previous
issues revolved around pulling data packets from the NIC
and formatting the packet into a usable structure. To solve
this issue it was determined that an off-the-shelf solution
could be used. HexInject [8] was evaluated and found to
perform almost all of the functions required for pulling the
packets from the NICs, and then injecting them back after
encryption. Also it provided a simple layer of abstraction
to the otherwise complicated task of sending and receiving
packets from the NICs. To capture the incoming packets,
HexInject is run in“sniff”mode and set to capture only a sin-
gle packet. Once the packet has been successfully captured,
HexInject returns the header and payload to the Python-
based encryption toolkit.
For the purposes of our experiments, each packet was
treated individually rather than being “streamed”, which
reduced the complexity of the implementation. This re-
sulted in the same key being used for every packet, although
each GOOSE packet was still different, due to the pres-
ence of sequence numbers and timestamps that form part
of the packet header, so each call to the encryption func-
tion and each generated ciphertext was still different. More
importantly, this simplification does not invalidate the tim-
ing measurements. On the contrary, this is a worst-case
scenario in which the cipher’s “stream” is primed for every
packet, rather than just at the beginning of the communi-
cation session.
As explained in Section 2.3, a stream cipher was our goal
and in particular SNOW 3G was preferred as it can sup-
port authenticated encryption. From the previous work
evaluating and testing implementations of SNOW, it was
decided that a wrapper was needed to provide abstraction,
in this case the CryptoMobile Python toolkit [5]. Cryp-
toMobile provides a Python wrapper for the SNOW 3G-
based EEA1/EIA1 algorithm. Although a Python wrapper
is slower than an implementation directly in C, this offered
a large saving in the complexity of the solution.
Once the encryption of the payload is completed by the
Python wrapper, it recombines the header and payload. On
exit it pipes the now recombined header and payload to Hex-
Inject, launched in inject mode. HexInject then injects the
packet back out onto the network through the NIC and re-
launches in sniff mode. The packet then arrives at the de-
cryption machine, where HexInject pulls the packet from the
NIC. HexInject then returns the header and payload to the
CryptoMobile Python toolkit for decryption. Once decryp-
tion is complete, it recombines the header and payload and
pipes it to HexInject for injecting back onto the network.
4.2 Speed Improvements
A number of methods were used to achieve the highest
possible performance in the architecture described above.
Firstly, we disabled NIC interrupt moderation to stop the
NIC from waiting for a poll and from binding packets to-
gether. The CPU subsequently has a higher usage as it tries
to access interrupts more frequently [34]. We also turned
off Large Receive Oﬄoad (LRO), which can aggregate pack-
ets from a single stream into a large buffer before they are
passed up the network stack [34], even though it should not
have been used anyway.
We found that the interrupt from the NIC would occur
at a seemingly random amount of time after I/O was com-
pleted, possibly due to an inefficiency in the operating sys-
tem’s interrupt handlers, as the operating system has the
ability to delay the processing of interrupts. To combat this
issue, polling was enabled, which allowed the NIC driver to
act much faster when I/O operations complete [34].
4.3 Virtual Testing and Debugging
During development of the final implementation, at times
the solution was moved to a virtual environment. This al-
lowed for diagnosis of issues that were unidentifiable in a
physical system. Emulation was done using ESXi, and the
emulated computers for encryption and decryption were In-
tel 3.06Ghz Dual Core devices with 4GB of RAM using Intel
Pro1000 NICs which were the equivalent of the NICs used in
the physical system. Ultimately, of course, no simulation or
virtual environments was used for the timing measurements
described in the next section. All results were produced in
a physical testing rig.
4.4 Test Environment
Figure 6 shows the test setup for the experiments, which
used the following equipment.
Control equipment: We used two intelligent electronic
devices (IEDs), the General Electric C60 Breaker Manage-
Specialised Network
Capture Card
NIC NICComputerDecNIC NICComputer EncIED Switch IEDSwitch
GPS Time Source
Figure 6: Testing environment for timing measurements using SNOW-derived encryption.
ment Relay [11] and the Schweitzer Engineering Laborato-
ries SEL-421 Protection Automation Control [32] as exam-
ple critical infrastructure control equipment typical of that
found in power distribution substations. These two IEDs
were set up in a GOOSE publisher-subscriber pair.
GPS time source: A Tekron TCG 01-G GNSS Timing
Generator provided the time source for our experiments [33].
We used, depending on the device, either one pulse per sec-
ond (1pps) or the precision timing protocol (PTP).
Specialised network capture card: As a specialised
data capture card with onboard processing, timestamping,
and time synchronisation capabilities, we used the Endace
Data Acquisition and Generation Card 7.5g4 [9].
Computers for Encryption and Decryption: These
were Intel Dual Core 3.2GHz machines with 8GB of RAM.
Both machines had FreeBSD version 10.1 as the operating
systems. The NICs were Intel x540-T2 models.
5. RESULTS
In this section we describe the end-to-end timing achieved
for encrypted critical infrastructure data traffic using the
experimental implementation outlined in Section 4. Re-
call that our goal was to show that critical infrastructure
network traffic using the GOOSE protocol could be en-
crypted, transmitted and decrypted using the SNOW 3G-
based EEA1/EIA1 algorithm, all in under 3ms, as required
by international standards for cyber-physical systems in the
electricity industry.
On one IED, the SEL-421, the operator could press a but-
ton to generate a GOOSE packet which is then sent across
the network. The second IED, the GE C60, indicates that
it has received a correctly-formed GOOSE packet by illu-
minating a light on its front panel. This simple arrange-
ment allowed us to ensure that each of our packets were
being correctly encrypted, transmitted and decrypted using
industry-standard control system devices.
We gathered data from ten experiments for each of 100
GOOSE packets. The complete set of 1000 packets of col-
lected data is presented in Figure 7. The times shown are
the complete end-to-end data transfer times, including en-
cryption, transmission and decryption. As shown in Fig-
ure 6, the timing is provided by a specialised network cap-
ture card with nanosecond accuracy, synchronised to a GPS
time source.
The end-to-end encryption and decryption time was



















Figure 7: Results of 10 sets of 100 end-to-end encryption-
transmission-decryption cycles.
to be expected from a general-purpose multithreaded oper-
ating system running on a multicore CPU, our experiments
clearly demonstrated an ability to encrypt, transmit, and de-
crypt critical infrastructure packets in sub-3ms timeframes
even in software. For the 1000 packets from the ten 100
packet experiments, the average end-to-end duration was
2.79ms, the minimum was 2.50ms, and the maximum end-
to-end duration for outlier packets was 80.23ms. Within the
1000 packet test set, an outlier only occured 4 times. Fur-
thermore, each of the packets was received intact and cor-
rectly interpreted by the GOOSE subscriber IED (GE C60),
which acted upon the message appropriately (lighting up
the front panel). This shows that the IEDs commonly used
in critical infrastructure can correctly accept and act upon
packets that had been encrypted and decrypted in transit.
A more detailed set of results, focusing only on the
first experiment of 100 packets, is presented in Figure 8.
Clearly shown is that all but one packet had an end-to-end
encryption-transmission-decryption time between 2.5 and
2.6ms, well within our target range.
6. SIGNIFICANCE
To appreciate the significance of these results in actual
critical infrastructure, consider that meeting timing require-
ments is essential to ensure the stability, reliability and
safety of the mains electricity network. For instance, “fault
clearance times” define how quickly circuit breakers must















Figure 8: Detailed view of the first test set of 100 packets.
transmission network [4, page 516]. Several physical and
logical events must occur in order to achieve this, one of
which is sending the necessary message to the physical cir-
cuit breaker. IEEE Standard 1646 defines the maximum
delivery time for “breaker tripping” messages as one quarter
of the electricity cycle time [14], which is 5ms for a 50Hz
network or 4.2ms for a 60Hz network. The latter timing
constraint explains the 3ms bound for GOOSE messages in
IEC Standard 61850 [17, Part 5], allowing a small margin
for message processing in the IEDs.
Meeting these requirements is essential. For instance, the
Australian National Electricity Rules [4] govern the opera-
tion of the National Electricity Market, and these rules have
the force of law. Our experimental results in Section 5 show
that GOOSE messages can be encrypted, transmitted and
decrypted well within the tightest timing constraints found
in international standards. Despite the recommendations of
the standards, there is thus no timing-related reason not to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of control messages
in critical infrastructure with data encryption.
Furthermore, it would be possible to improve even further
on the experimental system developed in our research. For
instance, we re-acquired the packets sent from an IED off
the wire to encrypt them. Far more efficient would be for
the network interface card in the IED to encrypt the packet
before it’s sent. Also, having acquired the packet from the
network, we encrypted using software on a general-purpose
CPU and a multi-threaded, general-purpose operating sys-
tem. Far faster and more efficient would be to use dedicated
hardware for encryption and decryption. Given that these
enhancements are yet to be made, the fact that we have al-
ready demonstrated end-to-end encryption within the tight-
est timing requirement of 3ms, is a convincing demonstra-
tion that authenticated encryption for critical infrastructure
is practical.
7. CONCLUSION
Increased commoditisation and connectivity of critical
control system components is exposing critical network
infrastructure, with no inherent information security de-
fences, to cyber attack. System engineers are reluctant to
add basic security mechanisms such as encryption to time-
sensitive cyber-physical networks, due to a belief that the
overheads of doing so would be too high. On the contrary,
our experiments have conclusively demonstrated that au-
thenticated encryption, providing both data confidentiality
and integrity, can be added to an industry-standard commu-
nications protocol in a real-life hardware environment, well
within the timing constraints imposed on such systems by in-
ternational standards. This result paves the way for adding
such protections to critical infrastructure in industries such
as power, water, transport, etc.
Beyond this research, there are, of course, many decisions
yet to be made regarding which encryption method should
be used for which critical infrastructure protocol or type of
protocols. Furthermore, deployment of encryption in a live
network involves many issues not discussed here, such as key
generation and key distribution.
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